Is Lebanon’s Self-Regulating Chaos a Good Thing?

Many writers, including Michael Young, Elias Muhanna (a.k.a Qifa Nabki) and yours truly have regularly argued that Lebanon’s unique form of democracy — where the checks and balances of sectarian rivalry make for an inhospitable environment for dictatorship — is on balance a good thing because it allows for a modicum of free expression and progress.

Nicholas Noe of Beirut Exchange disputes that:

[The system] does work for Achrafieh intellectuals, for foreigners like myself, for visitors and of course for wealthy people in general. [But it] does NOT work for the overwhelming number of citizens, even if it holds out the rhetoric and reality of some limited personal freedoms and movement. This is one essential problem with Young’s argument in his book — it takes a dim view on the expressed desires of huge segments of the population and revels in way an elite driven system opens up space for personal freedom.

He could be right. This could indeed be an elite-only fantasy. But a weak state and competing zaims do have some practical benefits even for the lesser off. For example, if a poor man in Tripoli gets sick, The Safadi Foundation, The Azm Foundation (Miqati) and the Future Foundation (Hariri) will all race to cover his medical expenses. Some people even fake illness, game the system and end up getting money from all three billionaire-funded foundations.

Evidently this is far from ideal. This is the very definition of healthcare with strings attached. But the argument is not that the system is good in absolute. It’s that it’s good by regional standards. In a place like Egypt, the same sick man has a higher probability of dying of neglect.