Facing Lebanon’s Two Great Delusions

I hate to admit this but I think I’m coming around to the positions of Prime Minister Najib Mikati and President Michel Suleiman.

Yes, I still don’t like the way with which PM Mikati was installed, and yes I believe that a consensual president representing the lowest common denominator has very little to offer Lebanon. But these two men have been doing something really important and — dare I say it — admirable, in the last few weeks: They are trying to hold down the political center in a country under tremendous pressure to spin apart.

The triumphalists vs the defensive

Unlike what you may have heard, the events in Syria are aggravating the division in Lebanon. On one side we have the March 14 alliance which supports the Syrian revolution; its members believe that the revolutionaries are going to win, so they see no point in yielding any ground to Hezbollah. Some partisans are getting so carried away by triumphalism that they are having wild expectations of a future in which Hezbollah is completely incapacitated and dethroned.

On the other side we have the March 8 coalition which is putting together a contingency plan for a post-Assad period. There’s a lot of denial, chest beating and intransigence in that camp, but there’s also some serious fear and defensiveness about a perceived future in which dominant Sunni Islamists rule over the Levant and make life difficult for Lebanon’s Christians and Shias. Fear is a powerful motivator, but if you add Hezbollah’s arsenal to the mix, only god knows what kind of crazy ideas March 8 might get.

A managed political transition

The Lebanese political center is an unpopular and thankless place to be right now. But it is a very important place not only because it’s pragmatic and sensible, but because without it Lebanon risks spinning out of control. Mr. Miqati’s dissociation policy, President Suleiman’s call for national dialogue, Walid Jumblat’s pivoting and Amin Gemayel’s opportunism are all essential — if unsavoury — parts of a new center that can play an important role in easing the political transition from a pre-Assad to a post-Assad Lebanon.

The center is where we are going to face two great Lebanese delusions: The first (held by March 14 supporters) is that once the Assad regime is gone, things in Lebanon will be sorted out on their own and we will live happily ever after. The second delusion (held by March 8 supporters) is that nothing will change once Assad is gone and we’ll also live happily ever after.

The truth is that after Assad is gone, a significant transfer of political power will take place in Lebanon. The only choice we have is on how that transfer will take place. Will we have a negotiated transfer, a grand bargain where all the groups sit and talk it out like grown ups, or are we going to entrench ourselves in our delusions and get into a messy, drawn out brawl that will leave us all worse off?